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Abstract—Smart grid (SG) is a complex cyber-physical system
that utilizes modern cyber and physical equipment to run at
an optimal operating point. Cyberattacks are the principal
threats confronting the usage and advancement of the state-
of-the-art systems. The advancement of SG has added a wide
range of technologies, equipment, and tools to make the sys-
tem more reliable, efficient, and cost-effective. Despite attaining
these goals, the threat space for the adversarial attacks has
also been expanded because of the extensive implementation of
the cyber networks. Due to the promising computational and
reasoning capability, machine learning (ML) is being used to
exploit and defend the cyberattacks in SG by the attackers
and system operators, respectively. In this paper, we perform
a comprehensive summary of cyberattacks generation, detection,
and mitigation schemes by reviewing state-of-the-art research in
the SG domain. Additionally, we have summarized the current
research in a structured way using tabular format. We also
present the shortcomings of the existing works and possible future
research direction based on our investigation.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems; cyberattacks; smart
grid; anomaly detection system; machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern power system, a vast amount of intelligent
devices form a cyber network to monitor, control, and protect
the physical network. The cyber-physical (CP) networks’ inter-
dependency is the backbone of the modern smart grid (SG).
Fig. 1 illustrates the typical multi-layer architecture of SG,
composed of physical, data acquisition, communication, and
application layers. The physical layer consists of generation,
transmission, and distribution networks [1]–[3]. SG incorpo-
rates distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar, wind,
hydro, etc., connected to the grid with converters for extracting
maximum power [4]–[7]. The data acquisition layer consists
of smart sensors and measurement devices, where the smart
devices collect data and transmit them to the communica-
tion layer. The communication layer includes a wide variety
of wired/wireless technologies and network devices, which
transmits data to the energy management system (EMS) that
optimizes, monitors, and sends control signals to the actuators.
Though the cyber layers improve the efficiency of the SG,
they might put the system at higher risk by expanding the at-
tack space. An attacker can compromise the vulnerable points,
disrupting the monitoring and controlling of the physical
equipment [8]–[11]. Additionally, demand response, energy
efficiency, dynamic electricity market, distributed automation,
etc. are the key features of the SG network [12]–[14]. All these
salient features nominate the SG, a very complex network.
machine learning (ML) is a ubiquitous prominent tool with
capability of extracting patterns in any complex network
data without being explicitly programmed. Recently, a lot of
researchers are using ML to analyze the cybersecurity of SG.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of the cyber-physical systems of smart grid
Until now, a few ML-based security surveys have been
conducted in the smart grid domain. A detailed overview
of ML-based security analysis of false data injection (FDI)
attack in SG has been presented by Muslehet et al. [22].
However, the review focus was limited to a single attack.
Hossain et al. conducted a study on the application of big
data and ML in the electrical power grid [23]. Most of the
existing review papers do not include recent trends toward the
application of ML in the security study of SG. This survey
paper provides a review of state-of-the-art applications of ML
in attack generation, detection, and mitigation schemes in the
SG. After introducing the existing and emerging ML-based
security issues, this paper attempts to inspire the researchers
in providing security solutions with a view to increasing the
resiliency of the SG.
II. MACHINE LEARNING BASED ATTACK GENERATION
ML-based attacks in the SG domain are less explored.
Table I summarizes the ML-based attack generation in SG.
According to the existing research works, four types of ML
algorithms are utilized to generate malicious data to launch an
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TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF ML-BASED ATTACK GENERATION TECHNIQUES IN SMART GRID
Reference Institution Year Attack Type Attack Goal Category MLAlgorithm Performance Testbed
Paul et al. [15] South Dakota StateUniversity, USA
Generation loss,
Line outage Unsupervised K-means
Line outage-63
Generation loss-
12029 MW
W&W 6, IEEE 7,
8, 300 bus
Ni et al. [16] South Dakota StateUniversity, USA
2019 Optimal MultistageAttack Sequence
for Line outage
Line outage-
30%, Generation
loss-60%
W&W 6 bus and
IEEE 39 bus
Ni et al. [17] South Dakota StateUniversity, USA 2017
Optimal Attack
Sequence for
Blackout
W&W 6 bus and
IEEE 30 bus
Yan et al. [18] University of RhodeIsland, USA 2016
Line
Switching Optimal Attack
Sequence for
Blackout
Reinforcement Q-learning
Generation
loss- 160.1278
MW and blackout IEEE 5, 24, and300 bus
Chen et al. [19] Tsinghua University,China 2019
Disrupt Automatic
Voltage Control Reinforcement Q-learning Voltage sag- 0.5 pu IEEE 39 bus
Ahmadian et al. [20] University ofHouston, USA Maximize Cost Unsupervised GAN
Generated fake
load data IEEE 5 bus
Nawaz et al. [21] Air University,Pakistan
2018 FDIA State Estimation Supervised LR Generated stealthyFDI attack vectors IEEE 5 bus
attack in the SG. K-means and Q-learning algorithms are used
to launch the line switching attacks. In contrast, Q-learning,
generative adversarial networks (GAN), and linear regression
(LR) models are used to generate false data injection (FDI)
attacks.
Paul et al. used load ranking and K-means clustering algo-
rithms as two different approaches to attack SG for selecting
the most vulnerable transmission lines to create contingen-
cies [15]. They found that clustering-based algorithms perform
better in tripping transmission lines. On the other hand, load
ranking shows better results to gain higher generation loss.
In [18], Yan et al. proposed Q-learning-based cyberattacks
in different buses of the system that leads the system to
blackout. Ni et al. proposed another reinforcement learning-
based sequential line switching attack to initiate blackout [17].
They recently proposed a multistage game using a Q-learning
algorithm to create transmission line outage and generation
loss [16]. Nawaz et al. proposed an LR-based FDI attack
generator against the state estimation of the SG. They imple-
mented and evaluated their model on IEEE 5 bus system [21].
Ahmadian et al. presented a GAN-based false load data
generator in [20]. The attacker’s goal was to maximize the
generation cost by injecting that false load data into the
system. Recently, Chen et al. also presented a Q-learning-
based FDI attack generator against the automatic voltage
control using partially observable Markov decision process and
was able to create a voltage sag on IEEE 39 bus system [24].
III. MACHINE LEARNING BASED ATTACK DETECTION
A wide range of research has been conducted to detect
various attacks in SG leveraging ML approaches. In this
section, we review the existing research efforts of ML-based
attack detection in various segments of the SG, as summarized
in Table II. In the following subsections, we discuss the
detection techniques of a few prevalent cyberattacks.
A. False Data Injection Attack
Most of the research efforts attempted to detect stealthy
FDI attacks using ML. Esmalifalak et al. attempted to de-
tect stealthy FDI attacks using a support vector machine
(SVM)-based technique and a statistical anomaly detection ap-
proach [25]. They showed that SVM outperforms the statistical
approach when the model is trained with sufficient data. He
et al. proposed a conditional deep belief network (CDBfN)-
based detection scheme that extracts temporal features from
distributed sensor measurements [34]. The proposed detection
scheme is robust against various attacked measurements and
environmental noise levels. Moreover, it can perform better
than SVM and artificial neural network (ANN)-based detection
mechanisms. Karimipour et al. proposed a continuous, compu-
tationally efficient, and independent mechanism using feature
extraction scheme and time series partitioning method to detect
FDI attacks [36]. This paper used dynamic bayesian networks
(DBsN) concept and Boltzmann machine-based learning algo-
rithms to detect unobservable attacks. Valdes et al. presented
a novel intrusion detection system (IDS) utilizing adaptive
resonance theory (ART) and self-organizing maps (SOM) to
differentiate normal, fault, and attack states in a distribution
substation system [46]. Yan et al. viewed the FDI attack
detection problem as a binary classification problem and
attempted to solve it using three different algorithms: SVM,
K-nearest neighbor (KNN), and extended nearest neighbor
(ENN) [26]. Their experimental analysis showed that all
these algorithms could be tuned to attain optimal performance
against FDI attack detection. Ayad et al. examined the use of a
recurrent neural network (RNN)-based method that deals with
temporal and spatial correlations between the measurements,
unlike other learning methods, to recognize FDI attacks in
SG. [44]. Niu et al. presented a deep learning-based framework
combining a convolutional neural network (CNN) and a long
short term memory (LSTM) network to detect novel FDI
attacks [45]. Sakhnini et al. analyzed three different algorithms
(e.g., ANN, KNN, and SVM) that incorporate different feature
selection (FS) techniques and used a genetic algorithm (GA)
as optimal FS method for power systems. The authors of [43]
proposed a nonlinear autoregressive exogenous (NARX) neu-
ral networks to estimate DC current and voltage to detect
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION OF ML-BASED ATTACK DETECTION TECHNIQUES IN SMART GRID
Category MLAlgorithm Attack
Number of
Features Data Collection Testbed Performance Reference
304 MATPOWERsimulation tool IEEE 118 bus 99% accuracy [25]
NA NA IEEE 30 bus 96.1% accuracy [26]FDI
34 MATPOWERsimulation tool IEEE 14 bus 90.79% accuracy [27]
IL NA Ground truthprofile database
IEC 61850
conforming testbed 91% accuracy [28]
CC 233 SE-MF datasets IEEE 14, 39-, 57and 118-bus systems
99.954% accuracy
and 0.939 F1-score [29]
SVM
DoS, R2L,
and U2R NA NSL-KDD dataset NA
0.67% FPR and
2.15% FNR [30]
NA NA IEEE 30 bus 95.1% accuracy [26]
FDI 34 MATPOWERsimulation tool IEEE 14 bus 85.59% accuracy [27]KNN
CC 233 SE-MF datasets IEEE 14, 39-, 57and 118-bus systems 77.234% accuracy [29]
ENN FDI NA NA IEEE 30 bus 100% accuracy [26]
BF, DoS/DDoS,
PS, etc. 80
CIC-IDS2017
dataset NA 99.6% accuracy [31]DT DoS , 2 N/A N/A 100% [32]
DoS NA NS2 simulation tool NA 99% Accuracy [33]
NB CC 233 SE-MF datasets IEEE 14, 39-, 57and 118-bus systems
67.321% accuracy
and 0.631 F1-score [29]
CDBfN FDI NA MATPOWERsimulation tool IEEE 118, 300 bus 98% accuracy [34]
48 Irish Social ScienceData Archive Center NA 84.37% accuracy [35]
FDI 34 MATPOWERsimulation tool IEEE 14 bus 81.78% accuracy [27]ANN
CC 233 SE-MF datasets IEEE 14, 39, 57and 118-bus systems
86.469% accuracy
and 0.863 F1-score [29]
DBsN FDI NA NA IEEE 39, 118,and 2848 bus 99% accuracy [36]
DL model
(Novel)
DoS/DDoS,
PS etc. 80 CIC-IDS 2017 dataset N/A 99.99% accuracy [37]
EDAD CC 233 SE-MF datasets IEEE 14, 39-, 57and 118-bus systems 90% accuracy [38]
XGBoost XSS, SQLI, DoS/DDoS, PS, etc. 71 CIC-IDS2018 dataset NA
99.87% precision
and 99.75% recall [39]
DT coupled
SVM (Novel) ET NA NA NA 92.5% accuracy [40]
Adaboost CC 233 SE-MF datasets IEEE 14, 39-, 57and 118-bus systems
85.958% accuracy
and 0.852 F1-score [29]
AIRS DoS, R2L,U2R, and PA NA NSL-KDD dataset NA
1.3% FPR, and
26.32% FNR [30]
Multi-SVM DoS 44 ADFA-LD NA 90 accuracy% [41]
Autoencoder ANN FDI. 339 NA IEEE 118 bus 95.05% accuracy [42]
NARX ANN FDI. NA OPAL-RT simulator DC microgrid system 95.05% accuracy [43]
112 MATPOWERsimulation tool IEEE 30 bus
99.9% accuracy,
91.529% precision,
and 85.02% recall
[44]
Supervised
RNN FDI 41 NSL-KDD dataset IEEE 39 bus 90% accuracy [45]
Statistical FDI 304 MATPOWERsimulation tool IEEE 118 bus 99% accuracy [25]
ART and SOM
based classifier
(Novel)
FDI 24 Real-time digitalSimulator(RTDS)
RTDS hardware
in the loop testbed 90% accuracy [46]
CLONALG DoS, R2L,U2R NA NSL-KDD dataset NA
0.7% FPR, and
21.02% FNR [30]Unsupervised
iForest CC 233 SE-MF datasets IEEE 14, 39-, 57and 118-bus systems 90% accuracy [47]
FDI attacks in DC microgrid and showed that the proposed
method has successfully identified FDI attacks during transient
and steady-state conditions. The autoencoder ANN-based FDI
attack detection mechanism has also been investigated by
Wang et al. [42].
B. Covert Cyber Attack
Ahmed et al. tried to detect covert cyber (CC) attacks in
their several research efforts. In one of their works, they pro-
posed two euclidean distance-based abnormality recognition
scheme for detecting anomalies in the state estimation mea-
surement features (SE-MF) dataset [38]. In their another work,
they leveraged several ML methods (KNN, SVM, multi-layer
perceptron (MLP), nave bayes (NB), and adaboost) to identify
a CC attack in the SE information that is gathered through
a communication network of smart grid [29] along with a
GA for optimizing the features. Their discovery revealed
that KNN has low CC attack detection performance than
the other ML methods. They also proposed an unsupervised
TABLE III
CLASSIFICATION OF ML-BASED ATTACK MITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN SMART GRID
Reference Institution PublicationYear Attack
ML Model
Type
ML
Algorithm Testbed
Chen et al. [24] Tsinghua University Beijing,China 2019 FDI
Reinforcement Q-learning IEEE 39 bus
Li et al. [48] North China Electric PowerUniversity, China 2019 Unsupervised GAN
IEEE 30, and
118 bus
Wei et al. [49] University of Akron, USA 2016 DBfN New England 39bus power system
An et al. [50] Xian Jiaotong University,China) 2019 DIA Reinforcement Q-learning
IEEE 9, 14, and
30 bus system
Parvez et al. [51] Florida International University,USA 2016 Supervised KNN AMI network
Mahrjan et al. [52] University of Texas at Dallas,USA 2019 DUA Unsupervised SVM MPEI
Ren et al. [53] Nanyang TechnologicalUniversity, Singapore 2019 GAN
New England 39
bus
Shahriar et al. [54] Florida International University 2020 LAD GAN KDD-99Ying et al. [55] Zhejiang University, China 2019 GAN Synthetic
ML-based mechanism utilizing a state-of-the-art algorithm,
called isolation forest (iForest) to distinguish CC attacks in
SG systems using non-labeled information. The proposed
mechanism can sensibly improve detection performance in the
periodic operational condition [47].
C. Electricity Theft
Energy Theft (ET) detection in SG mostly leverages super-
vised ML algorithms. Ford et al. examined a novel utilization
of ANN and smart meter fine-grained information to report
energy fraud, accomplishing a higher energy theft detection
rate [35]. Jindal et al. proposed an extensive top-down
scheme utilizing a decision tree (DT) and SVM. In contrast to
other works, the proposed scheme is sufficiently proficient in
accurately distinguishing and detecting constant power theft at
each level in the power transmission system [40].
D. Denial of Service Attack
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice (DDoS) attack detection has got a significant research
focus. Vijayanand et al. proposed a novel DoS attack de-
tection framework utilizing diverse multi-layer deep learning
algorithms for precisely identifying the attacks by analyzing
smart meter traffic [37]. In another work, they have used
another novel approach named as multi-SVM for DoS attack
detection [41]. Zhang et al. attempted to detect anomalies in
diverse layer network structure using SVM, clonal selection
algorithm (CLONALG), and artificial immune recognition
system (AIRS). According to their performance analysis,
SVM based IDS outperforms CLONALG and AIRS [30].
Radoglou et al. proposed a novel IDS for AMI using DT [31].
Boumkheld et al. proposed an NB classifier based centralized
IDS for accumulating all information sent by data collector
that requires massive memory and computational resources.
Roy et al. used extreme gradient boosting (XGBoost), random
forest (RF) on CIC-IDS2018 dataset for detecting various SG
cyberattacks, including DoS [39].
Moreover, the ML-based detection of cross-site scripting
(XSS) and SQL injection (SQLI), unknown routing attack
(URA), brute force (BF), information leakage (IL), port scan-
ning (PS), remote to local (R2L), the user to root (U2R) attacks
also gained some attention in the recent research.
IV. MACHINE LEARNING BASED ATTACK MITIGATION
Attack mitigation is the strategy to minimize the effect of
malicious attacks maintaining the functionality of the system.
Table III summarizes the ML-based attack mitigation in SG.
Wei et al. proposed a deep belief network (DBfN)-based
cyber-physical model to identify and mitigate the FDI attack
while maintaining the transient stability of wide-area mon-
itoring systems (WAMSs) [49]. An et al. modeled a deep-
Q-network (DQN) detection scheme to defend against data
integrity attacks (DIA) in AC power systems [50] and showed
that the DQN detection outperforms the baseline schemes
in terms of detection accuracy and rapidity. Chen et al.
presented a Q-learning-based mitigation technique for FDI
attacks in automatic voltage controller [24]. They replaced
the suspected data with their maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) values to enhance the securities of the state estimation
and OPF-based controls. In [52], Maharjan et al. proposed
an SVM based resilient SG network with DERs to mitigate
the data unavailability attack (DUA). Parvez et al. proposed
a localization-based key management system using the KNN
algorithm for node/meter authentication in AMI networks [51].
They showed that the source meter could be authenticated
accurately by the KNN algorithm utilizing the pattern of
sending frequency, packet size, and distance between two
meters. Ren et al. proposed a GAN model that predicts the
missing/unavailable PMU data even without observability and
network topology [53]. Shahriar et al. proposed a GAN-
based approach to generate a synthetic attack dataset from
the existing attack data. They achieved up to 91% f1 score
in detecting different cyberattacks for the emerging smart grid
technologies [54]. In another work, Ying et al. proposed a
similar GAN-based approach achieving a 4% increase in the
attack detection accuracy [55]. Li et al. proposed another GAN
based model to defend against FDI attacks [48] that provides
the predicted deviation of the measurements and recovers the
compromised sensors.
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Fig. 2. Pie-chart of mostly used ML techniques in a) generation, b) detection, and c) mitigation of cyberattacks in smart grid
V. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION
Fig. 2 shows the pie-chart of ML techniques used in attack
generation, detection, and mitigation for the SG network.
Fig. 2(b) illustrates that a lot of research have been con-
ducted towards the application of different ML algorithms
in attack-detection, whereas, generation and mitigation fields
are comparatively less explored. As SG is dynamic and inter-
mittent in nature, researchers are mostly applying Q-learning
to generate real-time attacks, as shown in Fig. 2(a). On the
other hand, GAN has the capability of generating missing
data with considerable accuracy, thus, as shown in Fig. 2(c), it
is prominently used in attack mitigation strategies. However,
GAN also has the potential to generate attack data considering
the system’s topology and states. Hence, future researchers can
focus on GAN and the other less explored algorithms such
as ANN, RNN, KNN, DT, etc. in the attack generation and
mitigation strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION
ML has been creating new dimensions for both attackers
and defenders with respect to scalability and accuracy due
to its wide range of applications in SG. Therefore, it draws
attention to the researchers for conducting security-related
investigations applying emerging ML algorithms. In this paper,
we review current research works, related to the potential ML-
based attack generation, detection, and mitigation schemes
for future researchers. In addition, we present a tabular form
summarizing the existing studies in an organized way that
would help future researchers to emphasize the unfocused
areas.
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